


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DIA and DOS have no objection to  
declassification and release.

5 September 1959




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
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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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DIA and DOS review(s)  
completed.

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

5 September 1959

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

NO  
\*USSR: Khrushchev, in his trip to attend Peiping's 10th anniversary celebrations immediately following his visit to the United States, will seek to allay any Chinese Communist apprehensions over the effect of his talks in Washington on Communist China's international objectives, particularly Taiwan. Khrushchev may seek to ease points of ideological differences, such as have arisen over the communes, by re-affirmation of his recent statement that each bloc country must take into consideration its "national, cultural, and economic peculiarities" in "building socialism." Peiping, however, is likely to press for a strong endorsement of its internal program which Khrushchev has criticized. The anniversary celebrations will, in any case, be the occasion for a major public display of intra-bloc solidarity.

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OK  
Communist China - India: Peiping is standing firm on its territorial claims along the Sino-Indian border, according to portions of a Chinese Communist note disclosed by Nehru to the Indian Parliament on 4 September. The note, received in New Delhi on 3 September, accused the Indians of "aggression" along the frontier and demanded withdrawal of Indian troops from some areas. New Delhi has rejected Peiping's earlier diplomatic protest that Indian border units started the fighting in Assam by violating Chinese territory, and Nehru now intends to refute Peiping's new charges by issuing a "white paper" giving the full Indian version of the border situation. While further incidents may occur, both governments probably still wish eventually to deal with the issue through diplomatic discussions.

Meanwhile, the Indian member of the Cairo secretariat of the Afro-Asian solidarity movement has given the secretary general--

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
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a UAR national--a detailed account of "Chinese aggression on India's borders" and is insisting that the matter be publicized among the solidarity committees of all Asian and African countries.

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

*1-10*  
Laos: In addition to its appeal to the UN for intervention by UN forces, (the Laotian Government has sent an urgent request to South Vietnam for material support and for troops to be used in southern Laos, particularly the Thakhek-Savannakhet region. President Diem, in informing Ambassador Durbrow of this approach,)

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DAILY BRIEF

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(stated that he would have to "think the matter over." North Vietnam would regard the introduction of South Vietnamese troops into Laos as justification for the entry of its own regular units. According to the Vietnamese military attaché in Vientiane, Laos has also asked Thailand for assistance. Re-ports on the military situation in Sam Neua Province are conflicting, but Laotian officials claim that the Communists are continuing to advance on the town of Sam Neua. [redacted] 25X1

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[redacted] \*A UN spokesman has announced that Secretary General Hammarskjold is setting up a Security Council session for Sunday or Monday on Laos' request for an emergency force. The USSR would almost certainly veto any Security Council proposal to come to the aid of Laos even in such a mild form as the dispatch of a UN observer or fact-finder. The USSR would probably call instead for observance of the 1954 Geneva agreement and repeat its demand for the reactivation of the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos provided by this agreement. [redacted] 25X1

OK

Sudan: A new group of dissident junior officers is reported to be plotting a move against the Abboud military government to follow the announcement of court-martial verdicts against the perpetrators of the abortive 22 May coup. The government has been deliberately prolonging the final set of trials, and plans to delay the verdicts until mid-September in order to allow time for a further shake-up in key officer assignments. The army, already on sunrise-to-sunset alert, is scheduled to go on full 24-hour alert beginning 10 September. Additional loyal troops will probably be brought into the capital to strengthen the Khartoum garrison. [redacted] 25X1

### III. THE WEST

OK

Argentina: The resignation of War Secretary Anaya on 4 September, following the truce declared by President Frondizi and rebel leader Major General Carlos Toranzo Montero, should quell present threats of revolutionary action growing out

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DAILY BRIEF

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of the internal army conflict over appointments to key commands. Toranzo Montero's main target was Anaya, who had fired him on 2 September because of differences over command changes. [REDACTED]

Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee Rent by Sino-Indian Dispute

The Sino-Indian border dispute has added materially to friction already existing within the Cairo secretariat of the Afro-Asian solidarity committee. The Indian member of the secretariat--hitherto very active on behalf of Communist causes --about 2 September submitted to the secretary general a detailed account of "Chinese aggression on India's borders," and insisted that the matter be publicized among the national solidarity committees of all Asian and African countries. He also demanded that the secretariat condemn Peiping's part in the dispute.

The Chinese Communist member of the secretariat is reported to have attacked a statement by the secretary general--a UAR national--that the Chinese "invasion" of Indian territory is detrimental to the solidarity movement. The Chinese asked, however, that no action be taken on the Indian proposal until he learned Peiping's views on the issue. The absence of such instructions suggests Peiping may have been caught off guard by the strong public reaction to the border incidents.

These frictions are further eroding the solidarity movement's value to bloc leaders as an instrument for furthering bloc penetration activities and for concerting anti-Western propaganda of the Communist countries with that of elements in Afro-Asian nationalist groups. The Cairo secretariat and the solidarity movement as a whole also continue to suffer from Nasir's anti-Communist actions earlier this year. In late May, the Soviet representative on the secretariat charged that Nasir was using the organization to attack Russia and Communism. Earlier, the Soviet and Chinese Communist representatives [redacted] frustrated UAR efforts to enlist Afro-Asian support for Nasir's campaign against Iraq.

Committee preparations for meetings and solidarity "events" are dragging. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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## II. ASIA-AFRICA

### The Situation in Laos

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The Laotian Government, gravely concerned over the deteriorating military situation in Sam Neua Province, has appealed to the UN for an emergency force, charging North Vietnam with aggression, and has prepared a similar appeal to SEATO. (It has also sent an urgent request to South Vietnam for material support and for troops to be used in southern Laos. Laotian defense officials would hope that the introduction of South Vietnamese troops, particularly in the Thakhek-Savannakhet region, would free Laotian troops now stationed there for use in the north. In informing Ambassador Durbrow of the Laotian approach, South Vietnamese President Diem stated that he would "think the matter over.")

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(According to the Vietnamese military attaché in Vientiane, Laos has also asked Thailand for assistance of an unspecified nature. Premier Sarit, while concerned over the situation in Laos, would probably be somewhat reluctant to provide troops for Laos, although he would probably be willing to provide material aid and make available training facilities in Thailand.)

North Vietnam would regard any overt assistance to the Laotian Government by Thailand or South Vietnam as confirmation of earlier charges that these countries were conspiring to expand the "civil war" in Laos. The seriousness with which Hanoi would view such developments was indicated in a statement issued on 12 August which declared the use of Thai or South Vietnamese troops in Laos would directly threaten the security of North Vietnam.

A UN spokesman has announced that Secretary General Hammarskjöld is setting up a Security Council session for Sunday or Monday on Laos' request for an emergency force. The USSR would almost certainly veto any Security Council proposal to come to the aid of Laos even in such a mild form

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as the dispatch of a UN observer or fact-finder. The USSR would probably call instead for observance of the 1954 Geneva agreement and repeat its demand for the reactivation of the International Control Commission (ICC) for Laos provided by this agreement.

During any subsequent General Assembly consideration of the Laotian situation, UN members' support for Laos would be conditioned by the extent of proof of actual North Vietnamese involvement, the desire of many UN members such as India to uphold the terms of the Geneva agreements, and by the "cold war" aspects of the issue in view of the exchange of visits between the US and the USSR.

Information from Laotian Defense Ministry sources reflects confusion over the situation developing in Sam Neua Province following Communist attacks on 30 August. They say Communist forces are moving in a two-pronged drive on Sam Neua town from the north and the northeast. There are no reports of major action in other sectors of the province.

A Laotian Army battalion and a battery of 120-mm. mortars are to be airlifted from south and central Laos to Sam Neua. This will thin security forces in areas where small-scale dissident activity has been reported.

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### New Plotting Against Sudanese Government

A new group of 30 to 35 dissident young officers is reported to be plotting a move against the Abboud military government to follow the announcement expected in mid-September of the verdicts of the court-martial against the perpetrators of the abortive 22 May coup. The plotters probably hope to take advantage of an expected sharp public reaction to the sentences; many Sudanese have come to believe the trials were rigged from the outset.

The government has been concerned for some time over continuing widespread dissaffection among junior army officers. Deputy Army Commander-in-Chief Hasan Bashir Nasir has attempted to head it off by transferring some officers and by posting trusted informants to the regional commands.

Aware of the current plotting, the government now is initiating more drastic measures. Abboud plans to delay issuance of the court-martial sentences until the middle of September to allow time for a major shake-up in key officer assignments. The army, already on sunrise-to-sunset alert, is scheduled to go on 24-hour alert beginning 10 September. Additional loyal troops will probably soon be brought into the capital to augment the Khartoum garrison. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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## III. THE WEST

Argentine War Secretary Resigns After Truce Talks

Threats of revolutionary action in Argentina, growing out of the army conflict over appointments to key commands, should be counteracted by the resignation of War Secretary Anaya on 4 September and by the reinstatement of Major General Carlos Toranzo Montero as army commander in chief. These were the immediate objectives the general sought in truce talks with President Frondizi on 4 September, only a few hours after he had established rebel command headquarters in an army school in downtown Buenos Aires. Toranzo Montero's position in the negotiations was strengthened by the protests made by most of the commanding army generals against his removal by Anaya on 2 September.

The new war secretary, Major General Rodolfo Larcher, was reportedly a prominent intermediary in the negotiations. Larcher, retired in 1957, has an anti-nationalist and anti-Peronista background which should please the Toranzo Montero partisans, who have considered Anaya too conciliatory in these two respects.

While the new appointments seem to have dissipated the crisis, Frondizi's capitulation to the strong pressures of the generals damages his prestige, and is a further blow to discipline within the armed forces, whose support is necessary to the stability of the government. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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